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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an increasingly growing tension between the United States
(U.S.) and the European Union (EU) related to personal data. Businesses
of all sizes both actively and passively transfer data across multiple
borders on a daily basis. In fact, it feels challenging to avoid crossing
over borders in interactions with customers, suppliers, and consumers.
The increasing reliance on the free flows of data across the globe for
businesses across all industries does not fit squarely within the
framework of data privacy and security regulations that apply within set
jurisdictions and boundaries.
Within an already complex regulatory environment, courts and
legislatures are grappling with the tensions of the free flow of data and
how to apply their laws while respecting the inherently global nature of
the digital economy and the sovereignty of third-country legal systems.
Within this backdrop, the EU, with its adoption of the General Data
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Protection Regulation (GDPR), continues to drive global privacy
initiatives with its robust privacy protections and enforcement,
including the impact of cross-border data transfer of personal data. But
its approach to privacy and the regulation of data protection do not
always align with the U.S. approach to these domains.
In 2017, the combined Gross Domestic Product of the EU and the
U.S. equated to approximately thirty-two percent (32%) of the global
Gross Domestic Product.1 With their combined economic weight, the
privacy tensions between the EU and the U.S. dominate the global
discussion and demand that the two regions develop a solution to
address these continued privacy concerns. This Article provides an
overview of the EU and U.S.’s legal jousting to the continued
cross-border data transfers between these two regions, focusing on the
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (ECJ) decision in Schrems II to
highlight the challenges going forward with regional data protection
laws and global data transfers.
Part II will detail the cross-border data transfer requirements
under the GDPR, focusing on the evolving agreements between the EU
and the U.S. to attempt to create effective cross-border data transfer
mechanisms between these two regions. Part III explores the ECJ’s
decision in Schrems II, providing insight into the continued criticism that
the EU lodges against U.S. surveillance law. Part IV details the response
to Schrems II in both the EU and U.S. Finally, Part V highlights challenges
in applying the ECJ’s decision to the real-world digital economy.
II. CROSS-BORDER PERSONAL DATA TRANSFERS UNDER THE GDPR
The GDPR provides for a number of mechanisms to transfer data
out of the EU to a third country.2 All permissible mechanisms must be
applied “in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons
guaranteed by this Regulation is not undermined.”3 Two specific
mechanisms under the GDPR for the transfer of personal data from the

1 The 2017 Results of the International Comparison Program, EUROSTAT (May 19,
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10868691/2-19052020BP-EN.pdf.
2 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), ch.
V., 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=
CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN#d1e4227-1-1.
3 Id. at art. 44.
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EU to the U.S. are relevant to Schrems II: first, the use of Standard
Contractual Clauses (SCCs);4 and second, an adequacy decision.5
The GDPR permits the transfer of personal data “only if the
controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on
condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal
remedies for data subjects are available.”6 One of the recognized
“appropriate safeguards” is “standard data protection clauses adopted
by the Commission in accordance with the examination procedure
referred to in Article 93(2).”7 At issue in Schrems II was Decision
20110/87/EU,8 whereby the EU Commission adopted the use of the
SCCs for the transfer of personal data from an EU-based Controller to a
non-EU-based Processor.
Second, under the GDPR, the EU Commission has the authority to
adopt an “adequacy decision,” thereby finding that “the third country, a
territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or
the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of
protection.”9 The factors that should be considered include “how a
particular third country respects the rule of law, access to justice as well
as international human rights norms and standards and its general and
sectoral law, including legislation concerning public security, defence
and national security as well as public order and criminal law.”10
A. The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Provisions
On July 26, 2000, the EU Commission adopted opinion
2000/520/EC11 creating the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Provisions for the
transfer of personal data between the EU and the U.S. At that time, EU

4

Id. at art. 46(2)(c).
Id. at art. 45.
6 Id. at art. 46(1).
7 Id. at art. 46(2)(c).
8 See Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for
the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries Under
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32010D0087&
from=en.
9 GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 45(1).
10 Id. at Recital 104.
11 Commission Decision (EC) No. 2000/520 of 26 July 2000, Pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the
Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently
Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32000D0520&
from=en [hereinafter Decision 2000/520].
5
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data protection operated under Directive 95/46/EC,12 the precursor to
the GDPR. Much like the GDPR, the Directive provided that personal
data could be transferred to a third country if that third country
“ensures an adequate level of protection and the Member State laws
implementing other provisions of the Directive are respected prior to
the transfer.”13
Under its July 2000 Decision, the EU Commission held that
companies who comply with the safe harbor privacy principles, publicly
display their privacy policies, and are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would be deemed to provide adequate
protection for personal data transferred from the EU to the U.S.14 For
the next fifteen years, the Safe Harbor Provisions remained a valid
mechanism for companies to transfer personal data between the EU and
the U.S.
On October 6, 2015, the ECJ held that the Safe Harbor Provisions
were not valid for the transfer of personal data.15 In support of this
invalidation, in the Schrems I16 decision, the ECJ found that:
“national security, public interest, or law enforcement
requirements” have primacy over the safe harbour principles,
primacy pursuant to which self-certified United States
organisations receiving personal data from the European
Union are bound to disregard those principles without
limitation where they conflict with those requirements and
therefore prove incompatible with them.17
This derogation from the principles of privacy did not include any limit
to U.S. interference with personal data transferred to the U.S. or “the
existence of effective legal protection against interference of that
kind.”18
12 Commission Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=EN.
13 Decision 2000/520, supra note 11, at ¶ 1.
14 Id. at ¶ 5.
15 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650; see also Press
Release, Statement on the Implementation of the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the
European Union of 6 October 2015 in the Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection
Commissioner case (C-362-14), Article 29 Working Party, (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/press-material/press-release/art29_press_
material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf.
16 Case
C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650,
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169195&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6785411.
17 Id. at ¶ 86.
18 Id. at ¶¶ 88, 89.
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The ECJ did recognize that the term “adequate” does not equate to
a requirement that the third country “ensure a level of protection
identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order.”19 Instead, an
adequate level of protection sufficient to permit the transfer of personal
data
must be understood as requiring the third country in fact to
ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its international
commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed
within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read
in the light of the Charter.20
Even with this backdrop that the U.S. must not directly match those
protections within the EU legal system, the ECJ still found that the Safe
Harbor Provisions, coupled with the protections (or lack thereof) within
the U.S. legal system, did not sufficiently provide an adequate level of
protection for EU personal data transferred to the U.S.
B. The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
The Schrems I decision placed the continued transfer of personal
data from the EU to the U.S. into a tailspin. Both the EU Commission and
the U.S. Department of Commerce were quick to respond.
On July 12, 2016, the EU Commission adopted Decision (EU)
2016/125021 finding that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield provided adequate
protection for the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S. In its
Decision, the EU Commission explained that:
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is based on a system of
self-certification by which U.S. organisations commit to a set
of privacy principles—the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework
Principles, including the Supplemental Principles (hereinafter
together: ‘the Principles’)—issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce and contained in Annex II to this decision. It
applies to both controllers and processors (agents), with the
specificity that processors must be contractually bound to act
only on instructions from the EU controller and assist the

19

Id. at ¶ 73.
Id.
21 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of
the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016D1250&from=EN
[hereinafter Decision 2016/1250].
20
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latter in responding to individuals exercising their rights
under the Principles.22
Further, the EU Commission specifically found that “[t]he
protection afforded to personal data by the Privacy Shield applies to any
EU data subject whose personal data have been transferred from the
Union to organisations in the U.S. that have self-certified their
adherence to the Principles with the Department of Commerce.”23 As it
relates to the provision of individual remedies, the EU Commission
found that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield “provides data subjects with a
number of possibilities to enforce their rights, lodge complaints
regarding non-compliance by U.S. self-certified companies[,] and to
have their complaints resolved, if necessary by a decision providing an
effective remedy.”24
Highly relevant to the subsequent judgment in Schrems II, the EU
Commission specifically assessed the access and use of any personal
data transferred to the U.S. by U.S. Public Authorities.25 Relying on
specific “representations and commitments” made by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the EU Commission ultimately
held that “the United States ensures an adequate level of protection for
personal data transferred from the Union to self-certified organisations
in the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.”26 The EU
Commission based this finding on the following core findings of U.S. law.
First, Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) imposes limitations
on “signals intelligence” operations. Specifically, “signals intelligence
may be collected exclusively where there is a foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence purpose to support national and departmental
missions, and not for any other purpose.”27 Further, these surveillance
activities must be “as tailored as feasible,” and “bulk collection will only
occur where targeted collection via the use of discriminants—i.e., an
identifier associated with a specific target (such as the target’s e-mail
address or phone number)—is not possible ‘due to technical or
operational considerations.’”28 The EU Commission found that the
assurances provided by the U.S. in relation to any surveillance collection

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at, ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 41.
Id. at § 3.
Id. at ¶ 136.
Decision 2016/1250, supra note 21, ¶ 70.
Id. at ¶¶ 71, 72.
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of personal data “capture the essence of the principles of necessity and
proportionality.”29
Second, in its review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) use of National
Security Letters (NSL), the EU Commission found that “insofar as
personal data to be transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield are
concerned, these authorities equally restrict interference by public
authorities to targeted collection and access.”30 To the extent any
surveillance activities are taken, those activities “consist[] entirely of
targeting specific [non-U.S.] persons about whom an individualised
determination has been made.”31
Third, the EU Commission received express assurances from the
U.S. government that the “U.S. Intelligence Community ‘does not engage
in indiscriminate surveillance of anyone, including ordinary European
citizens.’”32 Further, the EU Commission found that the U.S. assurances
were “supported by empirical evidence which shows that access
requests through NSL and under FISA, both individually and together,
only concern a relatively small number of targets when compared to the
overall flow of data on the internet.”33
Fourth, the surveillance activities within the U.S. are “subject to
various review and oversight mechanisms that fall within the three
branches of the State,”34 providing adequate oversight to any
surveillance of EU personal data. These oversight measures include
“civil liberties or privacy officers, Inspector Generals, the ODNI Civil
Liberties and Privacy Office, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board, and the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board.”35 And, these
oversight activities are accompanied by “extensive reporting
requirements” to address noncompliance, including Congressional
reporting requirements.36
Fifth, the EU Commission found that “[a] number of avenues are
available under U.S. law to EU data subjects if they have concerns
whether their personal data have been processed (collected, accessed,
etc.) by U.S. Intelligence Community elements, and if so, whether the

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at ¶ 76.
Id. at ¶ 80.
Id. at ¶ 81.
Id. at ¶ 82.
Decision 2016/1250, supra note 21, at ¶ 82 (emphasis in original).
Id. at ¶ 92.
Id. at ¶ 95.
Id. at ¶¶ 101, 102.
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limitations applicable in U.S. law have been complied with.”37 Judicial
redress against both the agencies and the individual actors within the
agencies, plus the opportunity to learn of surveillance through the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), combine to create sufficient
safeguards for individuals to seek redress for any unlawful surveillance
impacting their personal data.38 In addition, the U.S. made commitments
to appoint an Ombudsperson to investigate and address any
noncompliance with the Shield principles.39
Based on its assessment of the current legal structure in the U.S.,
and assurances from the U.S. government, the EU Commission
ultimately concluded that “the United States ensures effective legal
protection against interferences by its intelligence authorities with the
fundamental rights of the persons whose data are transferred from the
Union to the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.”40
III. THE ECJ’S DECISION IN SCHREMS II
In light of the holdings in Schrems I, Max Schrems, the plaintiff in
both the Schrems I and Schrems II cases, reformulated his complaint to
address Facebook’s continued use of the SCCs to transfer personal data
from the EU to the U.S. Again, the High Court of Ireland referred
questions regarding the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S.,
specifically questioning the limitations of certain U.S. surveillance laws
and the adequacy of the SCCs to ensure appropriate protections for
personal data transferred.41
In many ways, the Schrems II decision feels like a reformulation of
the Schrems I decision. First, the ECJ made clear that EU data protection
regulations still apply both during and after the transfer of personal data
from the EU to a third country.42 Further, the ECJ clarified that the future
processing of the personal data for certain national security purposes
does not negate the applicability of the GDPR to that personal data once
transferred:
The possibility that the personal data transferred between
two economic operators for commercial purposes might
undergo, at the time of the transfer or thereafter, processing

37

Id. at ¶ 111.
Id. at ¶¶ 113, 114.
39 Decision 2016/1250, supra note 21, at ¶¶ 117–22.
40 Id. at ¶ 123.
41 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, ¶ 68,
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228677&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=380028.
42 Id. at ¶ 83.
38
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for the purposes of public security, defence and State security
by the authorities of that third country cannot remove that
transfer from the scope of the GDPR.43
Second, the ECJ turned to the continued validity of the Standard
Contractual Clauses, and emphasized that “the provisions of Chapter V
of the GDPR are intended to ensure the continuity of that high level of
protection where personal data is transferred to a third country.”44
Further, the GDPR provides that to the extent that a third country does
not itself provide an adequate level of protection for personal data, then
“the appropriate safeguards to be taken by the controller or processor
. . . must ‘compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country’
in order to ‘ensure compliance with data protection requirements and
the rights of the data subjects appropriate to processing within the
Union.’”45
The ECJ provided three factors to be used to assess whether a
transfer under contractual clauses provides an adequate level of
protection: “data subjects must be afforded appropriate safeguards,
enforceable rights[,] and effective legal remedies.”46 Ultimately,
whether transfers are permitted under EU law is determined by
whether data subjects “are afforded a level of protection essentially
equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU by that regulation, read in
the light of the Charter.”47
Applying these factors to the SCCs, the ECJ clarified that the SCCs
are a general document, and do not apply or address any specific third
country’s legal adequacy.48 Further, since the SCCs are a contractual
agreement between two parties, the responsibility of confirming the
adequacy of their use lies with the
controller or processor to verify, on a case-by-case basis and,
where appropriate, in collaboration with the recipient of the
data, whether the law of the third country of destination
ensures adequate protection, under EU law, of personal data
transferred pursuant to standard data protection clauses, by
providing, where necessary, additional safeguards to those
offered by those clauses.49

43

Id. at ¶ 86.
Id. ¶ 93.
45 Id. ¶ 95 (citing GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 108).
46 Id. ¶ 103.
47 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, at
¶ 105.
48 Id. ¶ 133.
49 Id. ¶ 134.
44
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As such, the obligation of confirming the valid use of the SCCs in the
transfer of personal data from the EU to a third country is solely placed
on the parties to the SCCs themselves. The ECJ expressly directs “the
controller established in the European Union and the recipient of
personal data to satisfy themselves that the legislation of the third
country of destination enables the recipient to comply with the standard
data protection clauses in the annex to the SCC Decision.”50
Third, the ECJ, somewhat on its own initiative, assessed the validity
of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, ultimately holding that it was an invalid
mechanism to transfer personal data under the GDPR.51 Initially, the ECJ
recognized that similar to the Safe Harbor Decision, the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield provides primacy to U.S. national security, public interest, and
law enforcement requirements over the principles laid down in the
Privacy Shield.52 And, in order for that primacy to be valid under the
GDPR, it must be proportionate and limited to what is strictly necessary
to obtain goals associated with the personal data processing. The ECJ
states that
in order to satisfy the requirement of proportionality
according to which derogations from and limitations on the
protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is
strictly necessary, the legislation in question which entails the
interference must lay down clear and precise rules governing
the scope and application of the measure in question and
imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose
data has been transferred have sufficient guarantees to
protect effectively their personal data against the risk of
abuse. It must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances
and under which conditions a measure providing for the
processing of such data may be adopted, thereby ensuring that
the interference is limited to what is strictly necessary.53
As applied to the U.S. surveillance laws, the ECJ held that “Section
702 of the FISA does not indicate any limitations on the power it confers
to implement surveillance programmes for the purposes of foreign
intelligence or the existence of guarantees for non-U.S. persons
potentially targeted by those programmes.”54 Further, the ECJ held that
PPD-28 does not grant data subjects actionable rights before
the courts against the US authorities. Therefore, the Privacy
50

Id. ¶ 141.
Id. ¶ 201.
52 Id. ¶ 164.
53 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, at
¶ 176.
54 Id. ¶ 180.
51
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Shield Decision cannot ensure a level of protection essentially
equivalent to that arising from the Charter, contrary to the
requirement in Article 45(2)(a) of the GDPR that a finding of
equivalence depends, inter alia, on whether data subjects
whose personal data are being transferred to the third
country in question have effective and enforceable rights.55
Ultimately, in invalidating the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, the ECJ held
that “neither Section 702 of the FISA, nor EO 12333, read in conjunction
with PPD-28, correlates to the minimum safeguards resulting, under EU
law, from the principle of proportionality, with the consequence that the
surveillance programs based on those provisions cannot be regarded as
limited to what is strictly necessary.”56
IV. THE RESPONSE TO SCHREMS II
The ECJ’s decision in Schrems II launched a grenade into an already
tense and impactful area of the law. With economic pressures to allow
the continued exchange of personal data between the U.S. and the EU,
both the U.S. and the EU immediately signaled a desire to address the
concerns raised in Schrems II and work toward a solution.
A. The EU Response
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the EU agencies charged with
oversight of the GDPR, generally welcomed the decision as a
reaffirmation of the need to protect personal data both within and
outside of the EU.57 The EDPB expressly stated that
EDPB intends to continue playing a constructive part in
securing a transatlantic transfer of personal data that benefits
EEA citizens and organisations and stands ready to provide
the European Commission with assistance and guidance to
help it build, together with the U.S., a new framework that fully
complies with EU data protection law.58
55

Id. ¶ 181.
Id. ¶ 184.
57 Press Release, EDPS Statement Following the Court of Justice Ruling in Case C311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximilian Schrems
(“Schrems II”), European Data Protection Supervisor, (July 17, 2020),
https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2020/edpsstatement-following-court-justice-ruling-case_en; Press Release, Statement on the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment in Case C-311/18––Data Protection
Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems, Eur. Data Prot. Bd. (July 17,
2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_202007
17_cjeujudgmentc-311_18_en.pdf [hereinafter EDPB Statement].
58 EDPB Statement, supra note 57, at 2.
56
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In an effort to provide clarity to the impact of the Schrems II
decision, the EDPB provided a “Frequently Asked Questions”
document,59 which addressed the many questions posed by supervisory
authorities and businesses. The EDPB clarified that the Schrems II
decision was not limited in application only to transfers under the SCCs
and the Privacy Shield: “the threshold set by the Court also applies to all
appropriate safeguards under Article 46 GDPR used to transfer data
from the EEA to any third country.”60 Further, the EDPB reiterated that
as it relates to reviewing whether adequate safeguards are in place to
permit the continued transfer of personal data, “it is the primary
responsibility of the data exporter and the data importer to make this
assessment, and to provide necessary supplementary measures.”61
In supplemental Recommendations,62 the EDPB provided a
“roadmap” and additional guidance on tools that controllers and
processors can implement as supplementary measures to ensure
adequate protections for transferred personal data.63 The EDPB
explains that “‘supplementary measures’ are by definition
supplementary to the safeguards the Article 46 GDPR transfer tool
already provides.”64 Further, “supplementary measures may have a
contractual, technical or organisational nature. Combining diverse
measures in a way that they support and build on each other may
enhance the level of protection and may therefore contribute to
reaching EU standards.”65 Examples of supplementary measures
include encryption, pseudonymization, and split or multi-party
processing.66
Even in light of this guidance, the EU continues to assess the
validity of cross-border data transfers under Schrems II. Individual EU
member states have also weighed in on this influential decision. Within
a week of the release of the ECJ’s decision, Member State Supervisory
59

See Frequently Asked Questions on the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Union in Case C-311/18––Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd
and Maximillian Schrems, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD. (July 23, 2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc3111
8_en.pdf.
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id. at 5.
62 See Recommendations 01/2020 on Measures that Supplement Transfer Tools to
Ensure Compliance with the EU Level of Protection of Personal Data, EUR. DATA PROT. BD.
(Nov. 10, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_
recommendations_202001_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf.
63 Id. ¶ 6.
64 Id. ¶ 45.
65 Id. ¶ 47.
66 Id. at Annex 2.
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Authorities began to weigh in with varying responses. Certain Member
States affirmed the ruling but pledged to work with companies to
develop solutions to the invalidation of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.67 Yet
other Member States, notably Germany and Ireland, called into question
the continued transfer of personal data to the U.S.68 The Berlin
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information went so
far as to advise companies to transfer all personal data to Europe and
process only within Europe.69
B. The U.S. Response
The U.S., like the EU, immediately issued responses to Schrems II.
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross issued a statement expressing
that he was “disappointed” in the decision, but reiterated that the U.S.
w[ould] remain in close contact with the European
Commission and European Data Protection Board on this
matter and hope[s] to be able to limit the negative
consequences to the $7.1 trillion transatlantic economic
relationship that is so vital to our respective citizens,
companies, and governments.70
Further, in September 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce, in
conjunction with the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence issued a white paper, “Information on U.S.
Privacy Safeguards Relevant to SCCs and Other EU Legal Bases for
EU-U.S. Data Transfers after Schrems II”.71 The White Paper addressed

67 See, e.g., Updated ICO statement on the judgment of the European Court of Justice in
the Schrems II case, INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE (July 20, 2020), https://ico.org.uk/about-theico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/07/updated-ico-statement-on-thejudgment-of-the-european-court-of-justice-in-the-schrems-ii-case.
68 See, e.g., DPC statement on CJEU decision, DATA PROT. COMM’N (July 16, 2020),
https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/dpc-statement-cjeudecision (noting that the EJC “ruled that the SCCs transfer mechanism used to transfer
data to countries worldwide is, in principle, valid, although it is clear that, in practice,
the application of the SCCs transfer mechanism to transfers of personal data to the
United States is now questionable”); Schwere Zeiten für den internationalen
Datenaustausch, DPA HAMBURG (July 16, 2020), https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/
pressemitteilungen/2020/07/2020-07-16-eugh-schrems.
69 Nach „Schrems II“: Europa braucht digitale Eigenständigkeit, DPA BERLIN (July 17,
2020), https://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/presse
mitteilungen/2020/20200717-PM-Nach_SchremsII_Digitale_Eigenstaendigkeit.pdf.
70 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce Wilbur Ross
Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S. Data Flows (July 16,
2020), https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/index.php/news/press-releases/2020/07/
us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-statement-schrems-ii-ruling-and.html.
71 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE ET AL., INFORMATION ON U.S. PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS RELEVANT TO
SCCS AND OTHER EU LEGAL BASES FOR EU-U.S. DATA TRANSFERS AFTER SCHREMS II (2020),
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three key areas. First, many companies are not subject to laws that
would permit the U.S. Intelligence Community to access the data
collected and processed.72 Second, information collected by the
Intelligence Community is often shared between the U.S. and the EU as
part of diplomatic relations.73 Third, the U.S. legal framework maintains
privacy protections that restrict governmental access to personal
information.74
The White Paper directly addressed two of the key sources relied
on by the ECJ’s Schrems II decision: Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333)
and Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA
§ 702).75 First, the White Paper dismissed summarily the risks
associated with EO 12333, which it stated relates to general surveillance
matters and provides no specifics related to accessing personal
information collected and stored by private companies.76
Second, the White Paper provides analysis of FISA § 702, which
permits the U.S. government to conduct targeted surveillance of
non-U.S. citizens located outside of the U.S.77 Surveillance requests
under FISA § 702 relate only to communications obtained via the
assistance of an electronic communications service provider. The White
Paper highlighted that FISA § 720 establishes a judicial process
regarding data acquisition for non-U.S. persons. And “the overwhelming
majority of companies have never received orders to disclose data
under FISA § 702 and have never otherwise provided personal data to
U.S. intelligence agencies.”78
Further, before U.S. surveillance agencies can obtain information
under FISA § 720, they must obtain approval from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) and the surveillance agency
must inform the service provider.79 The FISA Court ensures that U.S.
surveillance is “targeted,” and limits the “purpose of the surveillance to
a specified type of foreign surveillance.”80 Further, the White Paper

https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/SCCsWhitePaper
FORMATTEDFINAL508COMPLIANT.PDF [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2.
76 WHITE PAPER, supra note 71, at 2.
77 Id. at 2.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 6–7.
80 Id.
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makes clear that “[t]he government must record in every case the
reasons a specific person was targeted.”81
Continuing to highlight the deficiencies in the ECJ’s analysis, the
White Paper infers that the ECJ took theoretical possibilities to be truths,
which distorted the view of U.S. surveillance laws:
The theoretical possibility that a U.S. intelligence agency could
unilaterally access data being transferred from the EU without
the company’s knowledge is no different than the theoretical
possibility that other governments’ intelligence agencies,
including those of EU Member States, or a private entity acting
illicitly, might access the data. Moreover, this theoretical
possibility exists with respect to data held anywhere in the
world, so the transfer of data from the EU to the United States
in particular does not increase the risk of such unilateral
access to EU citizens’ data.82
The White Paper directly addresses a concern raised by the ECJ,
“namely, whether U.S. law provides individual redress for violations of
the FISA 702 program.”83 The White Paper outlined a number of redress
mechanisms, including the FISA statute itself, which provides
individuals with the ability to seek compensatory and punitive damages,
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which “provides a
separate cause of action for compensatory damages and attorney’s fees
against the government for willful violations of various FISA
provisions.”84
Finally, the White Paper outlined the measures taken since 2017,
when Congress considered whether to reauthorize FISA. Specifically,
Congress removed the ability to seek communications “about” an
individual, and instead limited communication collections to only those
that are to or from the individual targeted by surveillance. This change
“reduces the potential for collection of personal data of EU (and other
non-U.S.) citizens because their communications now may no longer be
acquired under FISA 702 solely because a communication contains a
reference to a lawfully tasked selector.”85
Additionally, Congress passed amendments in 2018 that
incorporated additional privacy protections into data collections under
FISA § 702. These amendments included annual certifications of more
targeted data collection, increasing the agencies required to maintain a
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 71, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, and heightened reporting
requirements.86 The White Paper encourages companies to be aware of,
and use, these amendments to demonstrate that privacy protections are
upheld for personal data transferred from the EU to the U.S.87
Overall, the White Paper seeks to refute the ECJ’s conclusions
regarding U.S. surveillance law. In fact, the White Paper highlights that
there are numerous protections within the U.S. legal system that the ECJ
did not address in its decision:
There are numerous other privacy safeguards in this area of
U.S. law, not discussed by the ECJ in its review of Commission
Decision 2016/1250 in Schrems II, that ensure that U.S.
intelligence agencies’ access to data is based on clear and
accessible legal rules, proportionate access to data for
legitimate purposes, supervision of compliance with those
rules through independent and multi-layered oversight, and
effective remedies for violations of rights.88
Ultimately, this response sought to provide clarity into the U.S.
legal system and directly refute many assertions made in the ECJ
decision and in lower court decisions related to U.S. surveillance law.
V. MOVING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY WITH
CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFERS
Schrems I and Schrems II expose the challenges in applying one
region’s legal framework to data that flows freely across borders and
around the world. The ECJ’s approach creates two inherent oppositions
to explore, one practical and one legal. On the practical side, the ECJ
decision places a hard border on a borderless digital domain. On the
legal side, the ECJ decision attempts to apply EU law beyond its borders
in a strong, extraterritorial manner. Each is explored in turn below.
The Internet, and technology in general, have benefited from years,
if not decades, of uninhibited growth and development. Many of the
largest technology companies today (i.e., Apple, Google, and Facebook)
sit in historically unregulated industries, or at most very lightly
regulated. Because companies have been free to collect data, including
personal data, with few restrictions, these companies have built
infrastructures that span borders and seamlessly move data between
various regions on any given day.
Ultimately, this decision, which is forcing companies to move data
processing activities within the EU borders, could lead to the exclusion
86
87
88

Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 22.
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of the EU from innovative services and new technologies. In essence,
the ECJ’s decision could become a nontariff barrier to trade that isolates
the EU economy and hinders its global participation.89
In addition, it is dangerous for one jurisdiction to opine on the
application and breadth of another country’s legal infrastructure. While
there are certainly instances where a court or regulatory authority will
address another jurisdiction’s law, it is generally accepted that the court
will also accept the holdings and assertions made by that jurisdiction
and will not conduct its own de novo review of the other jurisdiction’s
law.90
In Schrems II, the ECJ conducted a “cursory, and frequently
unclear,” review of U.S. surveillance law, and used that review to
invalidate an influential international agreement between two strong
economic regions.91 This resulted in a lack of true clarity as to the ECJ’s
real concerns with the continued transfer of personal data to the U.S.
For example, “it is not apparent what aspects of section 702 expand
collection beyond what is strictly necessary or lack minimum
safeguards. The court’s incomplete analysis therefore provides little
guidance regarding the validity of current and future adequacy
decisions.”92
Further, because of the more macro-level review, the ECJ did not
necessarily understand the global picture of surveillance law in the U.S.
and the intended limitations on those laws that attempt to address
privacy concerns. By finding, in essence, that U.S. surveillance law and
EU data protection requirements are per se incompatible, the ECJ failed
to recognize areas where compatibility either already exists or could
more easily be found between the two regions.
The ECJ’s continual invalidation of the agreements between the EU
Commission and the U.S. as it relates to personal data transfers appears
to be driven by cursory reviews that do not include a deep dive into, or
complete understanding, of the U.S. law at issue. As such, the ECJ is
creating an increasingly high burden for the EU Commission and the U.S.
in order to facilitate the continued growth of mutually beneficial trade
between the two regions.
89

Elisabeth Meddin, The Cost of Ensuring Privacy: How the General Data Protection
Regulation Acts as a Barrier to Trade in Violation of Articles XVI and XVII of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 997, 1017–18 (2020).
90 See, Andrew T. Guzman, Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in WTO
Disputes, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 46, 53 (2009).
91 Court of Justice of the European Union Invalidates the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield––Case
C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:2020:559 (July 16, 2020),
134 HARV. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (2021).
92 Id.

FISCHER (DO NOT DELETE)

1582

5/9/2021 10:02 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1565

Additionally, the ECJ’s decision does not recognize that within EU
law itself, there are exceptions for access to personal data by public
authorities for national security, public interest, and police activities.
The GDPR expressly recognizes these exceptions: “This Regulation does
not apply to the processing of personal data . . . by competent authorities
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection[,] or
prosecution of criminal offences[,] or the execution of criminal
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of
threats to public security.”93 And, “[t]his Regulation does not apply to
the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out
activities in relation to the common foreign and security policy of the
Union.”94
As such, even under EU law, the activities outlined by the ECJ as
incompatible with data protection requirements may, in fact, be
conducted by EU Member States themselves. The ECJ does rely on its
conclusion that the U.S. surveillance laws are not “necessary and
proportionate” to balance an adequate level of protection for personal
data while permitting activities necessary for national security.95 Yet,
the question remains if that is a true assessment of the complete legal
infrastructure in the U.S. regarding the application of U.S. surveillance
laws and whether the ECJ in the best position to make that assessment.
In essence, the ECJ’s decision illustrates the dangers of one country
opining on another country’s legal infrastructure. This is, even more,
the case here, where the ECJ made findings directly adverse to the
assertions made by the U.S. government, both in response to Schrems II
and in its discussions with the EU Commission in the drafting and
adoption of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. This leaves an awkward path for
the EU and the U.S. to move forward: if the ECJ will not accept the current
representations by the U.S. government, what will it accept?
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the ECJ’s decision in Schrems II highlights the challenges
in creating regulatory and legal approaches that ensure that privacy
protections are adequately upheld while also recognizing, and
respecting, the law of different jurisdictions. The ECJ has dominated the
conversation, continually questioning the adequacy of protections
provided by the U.S. legal system for EU personal data. Yet, the ECJ may
93

GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 2.
Id. at art. 2.
95 Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir., Ltd., 2020 E.C.R. 559, ¶ 184,
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228677&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=380028.
94
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be overstretching itself by reviewing, and disregarding, interpretations
of U.S. law beyond its own jurisdiction.
It remains unclear where the EU and the U.S. will go from here. A
real question remains whether companies will be able to comply with
the movement toward data localization requirements when
infrastructures were built with the idea of the free flow of data.
Compliance and the risk of noncompliance, however, do create a
meaningful incentive to determine a path forward. The EU and the U.S.
represent two large economic powerhouses, and not finding a path
forward to transfer personal data between these two regions is not an
option.

